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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to address the following question: Does Congress have the power to 
confer standing upon an individual claiming that a privately owned 
website violated its federal statutory obligation to take specified steps 
designed to promote accuracy in aggregating and reporting his 
personal and financial data even if the resulting false disclosures did 
not produce concrete harm?1 This somewhat arcane standing issue 
involves congressional power to broaden the scope of the first of three 
 
 *  Professor of Law and Marbury Research Professor, Associate Dean of Research and 
Faculty Development, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to 
thank Richard Boldt, Bob Pushaw, and Aaron Zelinsky for their extremely helpful comments, 
and Sue McCarty for her tremendously thorough work on proofing, editing, and citation. I also 
received insightful comments from those who participated in the Maryland Carey Law Legal 
Theory Workshop, and Linda Morris and Matthew Sarna provided excellent research assistance. 
 1.  The formal statement for which certiorari was granted is: “Whether Congress may 
confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore 
could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of 
action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, 
Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (May 1, 2014), 2014 WL 1802228 (U.S. petition for cert. filed May 
1, 2014).  
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constitutional standing requirements: injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability. Although the case does not directly address the 
prudential standing elements—no right to enforce the rights of others 
or to litigate diffuse harms—this Essay will demonstrate that along 
with the remaining constitutional elements of standing, the analysis 
also implicates these prudential barriers.2 
Spokeo presents a valuable opportunity to solidify standing 
doctrine’s proper constitutional foundations. This Essay demonstrates 
that properly understood, standing doctrine is designed to preserve 
and protect congressional primacy in lawmaking. This includes 
deferring to Congress’s policy decision concerning who has standing to 
enforce its statutes. 
The financial stakes for the claimant (as opposed to his class-
action attorneys and the defendant),3 are fairly small, set at a 
statutory minimum of $100 and maximum of $1000 per alleged willful 
violation;4 as this Essay argues, the stakes for separation of powers 
are significant. The lower court opinions and the Supreme Court briefs 
present detailed technical standing arguments, and although not 
without their flaws, they aptly survey several core doctrinal issues. 
There is a sense in reading them, however, that the forest has gotten 
lost in the trees.5 The question presented—Congress’s power to define 
a technical statutory violation, affecting but not concretely harming an 
individual for purposes of the Article III injury-in-fact requirement—
goes to fundamental principles of separation of powers. This important 
 
 2.  In Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), Justice 
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, denied standing to Static Control, for a counterclaim 
under the Lanham Act against Lexmark. Id. at 1395. The case involved a deceptive practices 
claim arising from communications that Lexmark had sent to its customers, who also did 
business with Static, but not directly to Static, warning those customers against employing 
Static products to refurbish Lexmark cartridges. Id. at 1383–84. The Lexmark majority recast 
the “zone of interest” test, developed in Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150 (1970), which had long been understood to be a prudential standing barrier, to instead 
operate as part of a broader question of statutory interpretation involving who has the right to 
raise the statutory claim. Id. at 1388. More notably, Justice Scalia also suggested in dicta that 
the diffuse harm standing barrier, which had also long been viewed as prudential, is better 
understood as a constitutional standing element. Id. at 1387 n.3. Because Spokeo does not turn 
on the prudential standing elements or on the claim of diffuse harm even if that is treated as a 
constitutional standing element, this Essay does not explore that question. 
 3.  This class action suit has the potential to produce a rather enormous judgment if 
allowed to proceed, or more likely, to force a significant settlement as a means of avoiding such a 
judgment.  
 4.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Had the violation merely been negligent, he would have been 
limited to seemingly non-existent actual damages. Id. 
 5.  This has long been a problem among those assessing standing doctrine. See Maxwell L. 
Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 
(1995). 
        
2015]  THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATUTORY STANDING 223 
aspect of the case has likely been suppressed due to a natural 
tendency among lower courts and lawyers to emphasize how cases can 
be reconciled,6 and more to the point, to show that such reconciliation 
inexorably leads to the result they claim should obtain.7 Rare (and 
perhaps unwise) is the litigant who emphasizes a fundamental tension 
pervading the relevant doctrines, or that coming out for petitioner 
forces a strained reading in one direction, whereas coming out for 
respondent forces a strained reading in the other. Fortunately, as a 
law professor, I have the luxury to say just that, and I have written 
this Essay in that spirit. To be sure, I too will claim that my position is 
reconcilable with the precedents—it actually is—but my true objective 
is to show, plain as day, what the doctrinal tension is, how it arose, 
why resolving it matters. 
The case facts are as follows: Robins discovered that Spokeo, a 
website that profits from aggregating and disclosing personal and 
financial data, failed to abide by a set of statutory requirements, 
 
 6.  As one example, Respondent’s brief maintains: “Statutory rights are as worthy of 
judicial protection as common-law and constitutional rights because ‘there is absolutely no basis 
for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.’” Brief of Respondent 
at *24, Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (Aug. 31, 2015), 2015 WL 5169094 (U.S. petition for cert. 
filed May 1, 2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, counsel does not point out the ironic nature of the posit in the context of the Lujan 
case. See infra note 45, and accompanying text. Robins’s counsel further maintains: “Congress 
may not ‘abandon[ ] the requirement that the party seeking [redress in federal court] must 
himself have suffered an injury’” and that “‘[t]he province of the court,’ after all, ‘is, solely, to 
decide on the rights of individuals.’” Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)). 
Although Robins’s counsel uses this as a basis to distinguish Lujan, the Lujan framing of these 
issues tends to favor Respondent and derives from that opinion’s premise-shifting account of 
standing. 
 For its part, counsel for Spokeo cite Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000), for the following proposition:   
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he  
(1) has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to 
the challenged action of the defendant; and 
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.  
Brief for Petitioner at *11–12, Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (July 2, 2015), 2015 WL 4148655 
(U.S. petition for cert. filed May 1, 2014). But the Laidlaw majority recognized a Clean Water Act 
permit violation as satisfying the requirement of a justiciable injury notwithstanding its 
determination that the violation produced no concrete harm to the environment, thus placing 
that case in tension with Spokeo’s argument on the very point for which the case is cited. See 
infra at 231.  
 7.  This is also a natural consequence of the Supreme Court’s proper admonition that it 
reviews judgments not opinions. Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984) (“Nevertheless, since this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, we must determine 
whether the Court of Appeals’ legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment on the validity of 
the regulations.”) (footnote omitted).  
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codified in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),8 that are designed 
to improve reporting accuracy. The consequence for Robins was the 
disclosure of false factual assertions about him that some might 
consider a compliment: He was reported as married (he’s single), as 
having a job (he’s unemployed), and as having a specific set of 
professional credentials (he lacks them). It is not beyond 
comprehension that seemingly benign false disclosures might be 
harmful, and the brief for Robins presents the arguments.9 Were the 
Court to find a concrete injury in fact, Robins would prevail, but the 
case would be rendered trivial. There are other jumping off points as 
well.10 For an example going in the other direction, the Court could 
construe the statutory cause of action as insufficiently specific to 
confer Article III standing.11 The case is only interesting, however, on 
the assumption that it presents the issue for which certiorari was 
granted, and for the rest of this Essay, I therefore assume away such 
tangential inquiries. 
We now assume, therefore, that Robins suffered no concrete 
harm, or at least no harm sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement but for the statute, and that his standing claim rests 
solely on the violated statutory obligation to take more careful steps in 
gathering and reporting his personal information. We must further 
assume that Spokeo’s failure to abide by the statutory care 
requirements was willful. Under the statute, Robins is entitled only to 
actual damages if the violation is negligent, and to statutory damages 
if it is willful.12 Assuming no concrete harm, therefore, damages can 
only arise in the event of willful conduct. For Spokeo, the statutory 
damages create the possibility of a large adverse verdict—or perhaps 
more likely, a significant settlement—as Robins is the named plaintiff 
in a class action suit, another issue beyond this Essay’s scope.13 To 
 
 8.  Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). 
 9.  As examples: The site advertises itself as available for prospective romantic partners 
who might be deterred and prospective employers might think Robins dishonestly represented 
his skills or who might think that his income or other work requirements render him ineligible 
for positions for which he is appropriately suited. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at *44–45 & 
n.6. 
 10.  An argument in Robins’s favor would advocate less stringent standing requirements 
when the claimant relying on a federal statute sues a private entity, as in the Spokeo case, but 
more stringent requirements when the claimant sues a government official, including a suit for 
injunctive relief. For an analysis critical of this distinction, see infra at 235. 
 11.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at *10–11. 
 12.  FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).  
 13.  This Essay will not address the interplay between the statutory cause of action and the 
issue of class certification. Rather, it will focus exclusively on whether the statutory violation 
provides the basis for standing for Robins as the named plaintiff. 
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sharpen the inquiry, let’s further assume that even if Spokeo had 
undertaken the statutorily required additional steps to reduce the 
likelihood of false disclosures, it might not have identified, and thus 
might not have avoided, the mistakes affecting Robins that gave rise 
to the suit. This makes plain the purely procedural nature of Robins’s 
claim: The question is whether, on these stringent facts, Congress had 
the power define Robins as injured for Article III standing purposes. 
This Essay will explain why an affirmative answer is essential to 
preserving the separation-of-powers foundations of standing doctrine. 
A. Summary of Argument (and a Comment on Terminology) 
This Essay’s thesis is easily expressed: Properly understood, 
the primary purpose of standing doctrine is to ensure congressional 
primacy in policy making. This includes its presumptive role in 
monitoring the executive branch without undue judicial interference. 
Although there are circumstances in which the judiciary must 
interfere with legislative policymaking prerogatives, constitutional 
standing doctrines cabin such judicial power to a specific and narrow 
class of circumstances. An essential aspect of congressional 
policymaking autonomy involves its choice of means in monitoring the 
executive branch. As a corollary, Congress has the power to determine 
the conditions under which private individuals can supplement, or 
even displace, executive enforcement through such devices as citizen 
and taxpayer suits. Modern standing case law developments have lost 
sight of the doctrine’s critical function in preserving congressional 
regulatory and monitoring powers, and have instead shifted the 
doctrine’s focus toward protecting executive enforcement discretion 
from judicial encroachment. These two competing premises—standing 
as protecting congressional monitoring of the executive branch versus 
standing as preserving executive enforcement discretion from judicial 
encroachment—are ultimately irreconcilable.14 The Spokeo case helps 
to demonstrate the importance of restoring standing doctrine to the 
first, proper separation-of-powers foundation. 
Before proceeding, it is important to offer a brief comment on 
nomenclature. As the analysis below reveals, the Court has identified 
two aspects of standing doctrine, one deemed constitutional and the 
other prudential, with both sets of implications derived from the 
Article III case or controversy requirement. The term “constitutional 
 
 14.  And this holds even if, as Respondent appears to suggest, a narrow holding might allow 
those premises to be reconciled as applied to this case, for example, by claiming that the 
connection to Robins of the claimed statutory violation suffices to satisfy the Lujan injury-in-fact 
test. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at *24–25. 
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standing elements” refers to a set of requirements that Congress and 
the judiciary are duty bound to observe. These are contrasted with 
“prudential standing elements,” which Congress generally has the 
power to waive by expressly or impliedly conferring standing by 
statute, and which the federal judiciary, in its discretion, can relax in 
particular cases based on a variety of policy considerations. In 
addition, litigants can claim standing based either on a constitutional 
provision, typically but not exclusively equal protection, or on a 
federal statute. The term “constitutional standing” means reliance on 
the Constitution, as opposed to a federal statute, as the basis for 
standing. This is contrasted with “statutory standing,” meaning an 
express or implied statutory conferral.15 Unless the context dictates 
otherwise, in the analysis that follows, I will use the terms 
“constitutional standing elements,” “constitutional standing,” and 
“statutory standing” as described here. 
II. STANDING DOCTRINE’S THREE-LEGGED STOOL 
The analysis returns us to first principles. Compare Marbury v. 
Madison,16 the case in which the Supreme Court formally established 
the power of constitutional judicial review, with Allen v. Wright,17 a 
case that articulated what I will call the conventional separation-of-
powers theory of the modern standing doctrine.18 These are familiar 
cases to most readers, and the comparison does not require a detailed 
factual analysis of either; instead, the goal is to generate a set of 
parallel framings. After this initial comparison, we expand the scope, 
invoking as well the corpus of criminal procedure case law, thus 
allowing three-way comparison. The resulting “three-legged stool” 
provides the theoretical foundation of standing, and it serves as the 
starting point for the second stage inquiry, comparing claims of 
standing that rest on the Constitution with those that rest instead on 
a federal statute. 
In Marbury, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Marshall 
writing, declined to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of 
State James Madison to deliver Marbury a promised commission for 
which the President’s signature had been affixed, the document had 
 
 15.  The terminology is further complicated by the doctrinal tension relevant to this very 
case concerning the scope of congressional power to relax or expand the reach of the 
constitutional standing elements, including injury in fact. 
 16.  5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
 17.  468 U.S. 737 (1984).  
 18.  By this, I simply mean that Allen rested on a set of already developed Supreme Court 
doctrines concerning the constitutional and prudential standing elements.  
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been sealed, but alas, the final step, delivery to Marbury himself, had 
not occurred.19 The fatal defect, one that the Chief Justice himself 
helped to create, did not give rise to a discretionary choice on the part 
of President Thomas Jefferson, who refused to order his subordinate, 
James Madison, to deliver it up.20 Chief Justice John Marshall made 
plain that President Jefferson, the successor to President John 
Adams, who had signed the commission and affixed the seal, had a 
ministerial obligation to compel the delivery.21 Even so, the Marbury 
Court rejected the plea for mandamus, an otherwise appropriate writ, 
to compel the delivery of the commission due to a fatal jurisdictional 
defect in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which in Marshall’s reading 
empowered the Supreme Court to issue it as a matter of original 
jurisdiction.22 Marshall combined his reading of § 13 with a 
construction of Article III, § 2, clause 2, as authorizing the Supreme 
Court to grant the writ only as a matter of appellate jurisdiction. The 
effect was to render the jurisdiction-conferring statute ultra vires, or 
unconstitutional, thus forcing the Court to resolve whether it had the 
power to decline to exercise original jurisdiction in the case despite 
Congress’s contrary statutory command. 
Marshall resolved that question with dispatch: “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is,”23 making plain that the Court had the power and 
duty not only to construe the statute, but also to construe and apply 
the Constitution as a source of higher law when, as in Marbury, the 
two sources of law conflict. We can now express the Marbury holding 
as follows: When Congress acts (by passing the statute) and when its 
action violates the Constitution (creating a conflict with the 
Constitution), in a proper case or controversy, the Supreme Court will 
invalidate congressional action (striking the law down). 
Now compare Allen v. Wright.24 In Allen, the Supreme Court 
was called upon to apply the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause to invalidate an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) policy 
through which institutions, including private schools, operating under 
the umbrella of another organization that had already been granted 
tax-exempt status, received that status as a result of abbreviated 
review. A nationwide class of African-American parents alleged that a 
 
 19.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 155. 
 20.  Id. at 162. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 175–76. 
 23.  Id. at 177. 
 24.  468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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consequence had been to confer tax-exempt status on private schools 
throughout the United States despite their having engaged in racially 
discriminatory practices that would have disqualified them under an 
independent merits-based assessment. These parents further alleged 
that as a consequence of the de facto subsidization of private school 
discrimination, the public schools that their children attended were 
victims of white flight. The effect, they claimed, was to inhibit 
desegregation of those public schools their children attended. 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Allen majority, denied the 
parents standing, claiming that it was first and foremost the job of 
Congress, not the courts, to monitor executive conduct, including 
through its power of the purse.25  Congress could have accomplished 
such monitoring through various means. For example, Congress could 
remove tax-exempt status for private schools across the board, or it 
could, more narrowly, demand that such schools be assessed for tax 
exempt status on their individual merits without regard to the 
previously conferred status of a parent organization. In effect, the 
Allen holding implies that the Court is presumptively disinclined to 
step in to select among Congress’s choice of means. 
 
 25.  The Allen Court stated: 
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our 
cases preclude the conclusion that respondents’ alleged injury “fairly can be traced to 
the challenged action” of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way generally for 
suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the 
particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations. Such suits, 
even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, are rarely, 
if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication. 
“Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach would have the federal courts as 
virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a 
role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of 
the purse’; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately 
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.” 
Id. at 759–60 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Allen Court further recognized the 
obligation under Article III “against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce 
specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the 
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.” Id. at 761. This 
principle hearkens back to the admonition in Marbury v. Madison that the power of judicial 
review cannot be construed to allow judiciary to interfere with discretionary, or non-ministerial, 
executive prerogatives.  
 The complication in Allen that distinguished it from more conventional cases alleging 
ongoing constitutional violations is that striking the IRS policy would have forced a judicial 
restructuring of executive agency operations without, at the same time, ensuring meaningful 
relief, at least if such relief is defined in terms of furthering the racial integration of public 
schools that the claimants’ children attended. This explains Justice O’Connor’s reliance on 
identified links in the chain of causation as implicating a problem of redressability. Id. at 768 
(identifying four causal links involving parties not before the Court). As discussed infra at 232, 
whereas in conventional litigation injury, causation, and redressability typically coalesce, Allen 
illustrates an instance of institutional litigation in which they split apart, thus helping to explain 
their emergence as separate standing elements.   
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We can now express the Allen holding in parallel with the 
stylized presentation of Marbury presented above: When Congress 
fails to act (by failing to specify what happens when the IRS employs a 
problematic method of determining tax exempt status) and when that 
failure to act is alleged to violate the Constitution (thus violating the 
Equal Protection Clause by conferring tax exempt status on 
discriminatory private schools), the Supreme Court will not invalidate 
congressional inaction by acting on Congress’s behalf (thus declining to 
strike down the IRS policy).26 
Despite the seeming parallelism of these two cases, implying 
that the Court will act on affirmative unconstitutional congressional 
action but will hold back on congressional inaction that generates 
unconstitutional results, a third case category stands in marked 
contrast with the second. In this case category, Congress (or a state 
general assembly) fails to act, its failure to act produces an alleged 
constitutional violation, and the federal judiciary, including the 
Supreme Court in a proper case or controversy, routinely steps in and 
acts on the legislature’s behalf. This is, of course, the premise of the 
body of Criminal Procedure case law, which thus provides the third 
and final leg to the constitutional standing stool. In such cases as 
Weeks v. United States,27 Mapp v. Ohio,28 and Miranda v. Arizona,29 
the problem was not the failure to apply the exclusionary rule (Mapp 
and Weeks) or to issue Miranda warnings (Miranda). After all, those 
rules were crafted (or extended) in these very cases. Rather, the 
problem was the violation, through state or federal executive conduct, 
of a constitutional requirement, here arising under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments (as applied in Mapp and Miranda to the States via the 
Fourteenth Amendment), but with no legislative command (or with 
legislative inaction) as to the remedy that follows that violation. 
The Court in Allen established that in the ordinary course of 
constitutional litigation, it will defer to Congress as the primary 
source of lawmaking authority even at the price of condoning some 
alleged ongoing constitutional violations that allow Congress to fulfill 
its primary function as monitor of the executive branch. In Criminal 
Procedure cases, the Court conversely implies that when individuals 
are subject to the most significant sanctions that a state can impose—
criminal penalties, including death—it cannot await possible 
 
 26.  For a preliminary presentation of this framing, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided 
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1261–62 n.158 (1994). 
 27.  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 28.  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 29.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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legislative intervention; rather, it is duty bound (consistent with 
Marbury’s “province and duty”) to pronounce federal constitutional 
common law as needed to provide an appropriate remedy for the 
identified constitutional violation.30 
Certainly one can disagree with the Allen v. Wright outcome, 
and we can also find cases that appear in tension with it, for example, 
the body of standing case law that involves challenges to race-based 
affirmative action.31 And yet, these cases help to form the basis for a 
robust account of constitutional standing case law. This account casts 
these combined standing cases, along with the body of criminal 
procedure case law,32 along a normative spectrum. That spectrum 
involves whether, based on objective factors, each case presents 
primarily as a vehicle to create precedent, without necessarily 
providing meaningful relief to the claimant, or instead, presents as a 
means of securing relief, with the creation of precedent as a 
consequence or byproduct. The analysis develops from the intuition 
that the order in which cases are presented can have a profound effect 
on the substantive case law that develops, and standing doctrine 
works to limit the power of litigants to manipulate case law orderings 
for maximum doctrinal effect by presumptively requiring a set of 
fortuitous factors that give rise to a justiciable harm as a precondition 
 
 30.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. Although Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), 
might suggest that criminal procedure cases are mandatory rather than constitutional common 
law, and are therefore not subject to displacement by Congress, a better reading suggests that if 
Congress chooses to displace a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it must devise an 
alternative that is constitutionally adequate. See id. at 437. Replacing Miranda warnings with a 
balancing test, the very approach that the Supreme Court rejected in Miranda v. Arizona, failed 
that test.  
 31.  For a discussion that compares Board of Regents v. Bakke, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 
30–36, 271–81 (2002). The analysis does not turn on whether the nominal litigants in these cases 
subjectively intended to create law; rather, it turns on whether objective factors make the case 
appear as a vehicle for precedent creation or instead for securing relief. Id. 
 32.  This includes criminal procedure cases in which the strong presumption as to standing 
to raise the claim appears misplaced. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (allowing 
white criminal defendant to raise equal protection challenge to race-based exclusion of African 
American juror under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 
392, 398–401 (1998) (extending Powers in context of exclusion of foreperson based on race in 
grand jury indictment). Under traditional third party standing principles, there would be no 
personal injury for a white criminal defendant to raise a Batson claim as the juror exclusion was 
not based on his race, leading to the circular proposition that a white defendant can raise the 
racial exclusion of an African American juror because doing so provides the white defendant a 
basis for relief if relief is granted. For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNS, supra note 31, at 
259–63. See also Powers, 499 U.S. at 1426 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating that he cannot “understand how the rights of blacks excluded from jury service can be 
vindicated by letting a white murderer to go free.”). 
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to standing to sue.33 My purpose here is not to provide a 
comprehensive doctrinal review of constitutional standing or to 
present such a doctrinal reconciliation.34 Instead it is to construct the 
basic architecture of constitutional standing as a prelude to comparing 
the more specific question of statutory standing at issue in Spokeo. 
III. LUJAN AND THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY STANDING 
Before delving into modern statutory standing doctrine, a bit of 
historical background will be helpful. Legal historians have 
documented that the modern justiciability doctrines, including 
standing, find their origins in the Progressive Era. The linkage is not 
fortuitous. A central purpose of standing doctrine at its Progressive-
Era inception was to provide a judicial mechanism of insulating 
ambitious, and previously unseen, developments in the regulatory 
state from constitutional challenge. As William Fletcher,35 and 
others,36 have aptly demonstrated, one method by which Louis 
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter accomplished this goal was through a 
regime of presumptions: If Congress conferred or denied standing in 
particular statutes, those rules would apply; faced instead with 
congressional silence, the judiciary would analogize to doctrines of 
contract, tort, or property to see if the alleged injury was of the sort 
that was cognizable at common law. A feature of this regime was to 
favor standing for those who suffered traditional harms as regulatory 
 
 33.  For an analysis that assesses the corpus of standing case law against this theory, see 
STEARNS, supra note 31; see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: 
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Justiciability and 
Social Choice]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 309 (1995) [hereinafter Standing and Social Choice].  
 34.  For interested readers, I have provided such a review in several published sources. See 
STEARNS, supra note 31; Stearns, Justiciability and Social Choice, supra note 33; Stearns, 
Standing and Social Choice, supra note 33.  
 35.  See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1998). For a 
symposium celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of this publication, see Symposium, The 
Structure of Standing at 25, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269 (2013) (with contributions by Heather Elliott, 
William Fletcher, Tara Grove, Andy Hessick, Bob Pushaw, Tom Rowe, Jonathan Siegel, Maxwell 
Stearns, Ernest Young). The contributors to this on-line symposium overlap with the Alabama 
symposium. (Heather Elliott, Andy Hessick, Jonathan Siegel, Joan Steinman, Maxwell Stearns, 
Howard Wasserman). One Essay bridges the two symposia by extending Fletcher’s analysis to 
the Spokeo case. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257, 268–70 (2015).  
 36.  For a review of the literature, see Stearns, Justiciability and Social Choice, supra note 
33, at 366–67 and cites therein (discussing works by William Fletcher, Steven Winter, and Gene 
Nichol). See also Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s 
The Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 295–303 (2013) (reviewing history and 
developing argument for a fortuitous injury requirement derived from the Article III Case or 
Controversy clause.)  
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objects as compared with those whose claimed injury resulted from 
insufficiently aggressive regulatory enforcement. This once-
Progressive understanding of standing doctrine allowed Congress to 
play a central role not only in the development of regulatory policy, 
but also in the legislative selection of means by which such policies 
would be enforced. 
Today, commentators tend to view strict standing doctrine as 
conservative, and case outcomes like Allen provide fodder for this 
position, although there are also counter examples.37 The ideological 
valence of standing, however, becomes more complicated in the 
context of statutory conferrals. Consider the landmark, and 
controversial, 1992 decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.38 In Lujan, 
the Court denied two women who had previously traveled to Egypt 
and Sri Lanka standing to force statutorily required interagency 
consultation between the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of the Interior, prior to federal funding of projects 
threatening the habitats of endangered species abroad, which had not 
occurred with respect to the affected projects in those countries.39 
Despite the broad statutory conferral of standing to persons who 
claimed injury nexuses—vocational, animal, ecosystem—Justice 
Scalia, writing for a majority, denied standing.40 Scalia reasoned that 
the mere desire to have the government abide by the law without a 
more concrete personal harm, for example, one analogous to an injury 
cognizable at common law, was inadequate for standing 
notwithstanding the congressional grant.41 Scalia grounded his 
holding in the observation that the President, not the courts, holds the 
power to execute legislative policy, and that the statutory conferral, if 
relied upon to grant standing, would result in judicial encroachment of 
executive enforcement prerogatives. 
Scalia stated: 
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ 
compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit 
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most 
important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It 
would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, “to assume a position of 
authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,” and to 
 
 37.  See, e.g., infra note 47, and accompanying text, and notes 69-71, and accompanying 
text.  
 38.  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 39.  Id. at 563, 578. 
 40.  Id. at 566. 
 41.  Id. at 573–75. 
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become “‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive 
action.’”42 
Scalia claimed this reading was consistent with Marbury: “‘The 
province of the court,’ as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. 
Madison, ‘is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.’”43 Notably 
Justice Scalia omitted the immediately following Marbury passage: 
But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of 
the cabinet, it respects a paper, which, according to law, is upon record, and to a copy of 
which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no intermeddling with a 
subject, over which the executive can be considered as having exercised any control; 
what is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from 
asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the 
claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the performance of a duty, not depending on 
executive discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general principles of law? 
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color of his office, by 
which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone 
exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled 
to obey the judgment of the law.44 
More simply put, Marbury does not establish that the judiciary 
is barred from compelling executive officials to perform their 
ministerial obligations. Instead, it establishes the less controversial 
proposition that the judiciary may not cabin executive discretion. Of 
course, Marbury v. Madison did not involve executive discretion, and 
that was Marshall’s point. The Court lacked jurisdiction because the 
statute was unconstitutional even though mandamus was otherwise 
proper to compel a purely ministerial executive obligations. 
Left open in Marbury is the scope of Congress’s power to define 
as personal an injury that extends well beyond the boundaries of 
common law harms, a point to which we now turn. Most of Scalia’s 
Lujan analysis centered on rejecting the nominal claimants’ injury in 
fact. Scalia implicitly acknowledged this line of analysis ran up 
against a tradition of judicial latitude toward congressional conferral 
of standing, including broadening of traditional notions of injury. Thus 
Justice Scalia stated: “Nothing in this contradicts the principle that 
‘[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.’”45 Of course disclaiming a contradiction does not prove none 
exists. Consider Justice Blackmun’s dissenting rejoinder, which 
Justice O’Connor, the Allen majority opinion author, joined: 
 
 42.  Id. at 577 (citations omitted). 
 43.  Lujan, 504 U.S at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)). 
 44.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170. 
 45.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (quoting Linda R.S. 
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))). 
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The Court expresses concern that allowing judicial enforcement of “agencies’ observance 
of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure” would “transfer from the President to 
the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.’ In fact, the principal effect of foreclosing judicial 
enforcement of such procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at 
the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and 
emanates.46 
Although both Allen and Lujan denied standing, it is not 
surprising that Justice O’Connor joined the Blackmun Lujan dissent. 
That is because the dissent was consistent with the traditional Allen 
separation-of-powers theory of standing, one that Lujan appeared to 
displace. Consistent with Allen, Blackmun determined that Congress 
has the power to choose its preferred enforcement methods, including 
through broadening standing to create a basis for supplemental 
private enforcement. That is because the very policies sought to be 
enforced emanate not from the executive branch—the branch with 
enforcement power—but from Congress “from which that power 
originates and emanates.” 
Indeed, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia’s Lujan premise 
has not been universally embraced. In the 2000 case, Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,47 the Supreme Court, 
with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing, permitted a suit against 
Laidlaw for a technical permit violation under the Clean Water Act 
that did not result in any identifiable harm to the claimants.48 Sound 
familiar? The Laidlaw case originally presented on mootness grounds, 
and Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, rejected the mootness 
claim. She and Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, also used the case to 
revisit the Allen/Lujan debate. This time, the Laidlaw majority found 
standing and restored, at least temporarily, the doctrine’s 
congressional primacy foundation. 
In Laidlaw, a Clean Water Act permit violation resulted in the 
emission of effluents into a river near where claimants resided, but at 
levels that produced no identifiable environmental damage, and thus 
no discernible harm to the claimants. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that the violation followed from an erroneous calculation in the permit 
itself, thereby rendering the emissions entirely safe.49 Despite this, 
 
 46.  Id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 47.  528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 48.  Id. at 183–84. 
 49.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 207, 
233–35 (2001) (explaining that emissions did not render water unsafe based on review of 
Supreme Court Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of South Carolina, and the District Court 
opinion, demonstrating calculation errors in permitting);  see also Maxwell L. Stearns, From 
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claimants averred that the violation inhibited their enjoyment of the 
river, and on this basis the Court allowed the suit against Laidlaw to 
proceed.50 
Consider the following exchange between Justice Ginsburg for 
the Laidlaw majority, and Justice Scalia, writing in dissent. Justice 
Scalia rejected standing based on the absence of an injury in fact, 
stating: “While it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could be harmed 
even though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would have the 
burden of articulating the nature of the injury.”51 One might imagine a 
basis for satisfying even this restrictive scope of permissible injury if 
the publicity attendant the permit violation diminished property 
values. Even setting aside that possibility, which did not affect the 
majority analysis, Justice Ginsburg directly challenged Scalia’s 
premise: 
The relevant showing for Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment but 
injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather than the latter . . . is to raise the 
standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an 
action alleging noncompliance with [the required] permit.52 
The permit was issued pursuant to a statutory scheme, thereby 
establishing that there is no need for a concrete injury—or that 
Congress could define the permit violation itself as an injury for 
Article III purposes—where the basis for standing rests on a federal 
statute as opposed to the Constitution itself. We can compare the 
Ginsburg and Scalia approaches based on a conventional set of linear 
relationships from (1) permit violation to (2) individual harm to (3) 
justiciable injury. This, after all, is the way common law adjudication 
customarily proceeds. An event, for example a negligent act, a breach 
of contract, or a violated property right produces an injury to a 
plaintiff,53 and the courts treat that injury as the basis for a cognizable 
common law suit. 
 
Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 321, 379 (2001). 
 50.  For an assessment of the various claims of injury in Laidlaw, see Stearns, supra note 
49, at 381–83.  
 51.  528 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52.  Id. at 703–04. 
 53.  One might characterize an unobserved trespass that causes no property damage as a 
legal violation without injury to the property owner, even though the common law defines the 
trespass as the basis for a legal claim. Of course most persons do not press such trespass 
violations in court (consider the frequency of turning a car around in a property owner’s 
driveway). The claimed injury for those who do resembles Professor Fletcher’s observation that a 
non-lying person claiming to be injured by a legal violation, is, in fact, injured, leaving open the 
policy question as to which of these injuries we allow to have pressed in court. Fletcher, supra 
note 35, at 231.   
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In that framing, all of the features that have become requisites 
to standing are rolled into one: The injury is caused by the defendant, 
and finding for plaintiff will remedy that injury.54 These also tie in the 
prudential barriers: the claimant raises his or her own claim, and 
therefore the claim is not diffuse. This coalescence explains something 
critical about standing doctrine. The Court devised its doctrine with 
reference to the common law not because each standing criterion 
carries independent normative significance, but rather because these 
features conventionally coexisted in suits that for hundreds—nay 
thousands—of years were resolved in legal forums. This includes such 
ancient texts as the Code of Hammurabi and the Five Books of Moses, 
both of which created the basis for many legal claims that today would 
fall within the scope of the common law. 
But this feature of the common law, or more ancient codes, 
does not answer whether in our constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers, Congress holds the power to broaden the ambit of harms that 
it chooses to define as the basis for a cognizable injury. This also 
answers Spokeo’s argument that allowing Congress to define injury 
collapses the three constitutional standing prongs into one.55 This 
observation merely restates what we have long known: just as these 
features coalesce within traditional common law suits, so too they do 
so when Congress defines a justiciable injury by statute. 
In Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg did not disclaim that the 
conventional litigation model in which these standing factors are 
combined remains dominant. That, after all, has been the basis for 
legal disputes from time immemorial. Rather, she claimed that in our 
system of representative governance, when there is no express or 
implied source of constitutional limitation to its policy, Congress has 
the wherewithal both to create policy and to determine its preferred 
method of enforcement. The enforcement schemes can be varied, and 
they can include executive enforcement exclusivity;56 concurrent 
private and public enforcement authority, sometimes with the 
 
 54.  To be sure, injury in fact, which was developed in Association of Data Processing 
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), differs from the legal injury test that it 
displaced. Once more, however, these two variations on injury were also combined in the 
conventional understanding of a justiciable suit at common law or earlier. Although there are 
exceptions, the general supposition that rights and remedies were coextensive implies a 
coalescence of the personal and legal aspects of an injury in the traditional understanding of a 
legal claim.   
 55.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at *39.  
 56.  See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (enforcement procedures 
limited to the Secretary).  
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executive power to close off private suits;57 or exclusive private 
enforcement.58 This complex set of arrangements also allows for 
specific instances of private enforcement under FCRA, as in Spokeo, 
while providing a separate role for federal or state enforcement under 
the same statute based, in part, on consumer complaints.59 It might 
seem counterintuitive that Congress can empower private persons to 
enforce public rights, but on reflection, it should not be.60 Although the 
historical record has been disputed, there is evidence that before the 
framing and in the early republic, private individuals enforced legal 
actions that today we associate with executive enforcement power, 
even sometimes including private enforcement of criminal laws.61 
 
 57.  See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (subsection (a) allows Attorney General to 
bring a civil action against a violator, and subsection (b) allows a “private person” to bring suit 
against a violator on behalf of the person and the government, “in the name of the government”); 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (private right of action) § 216(c) (actions by the 
Secretary of Labor); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (private right of action unless the 
Administrator or the State is “diligently prosecuting a civil action”).  
 58.   See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Of course this statute contemplates private enforcement of 
rights that the federal government generally has the power to otherwise enforce separately.   
 59.  15 U.S.C. 1681n (civil liability for willful noncompliance); 15 U.S.C. 1681s 
(administrative enforcement procedures). 
 60.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975). 
 61.  The following provides an apt summary of the once-prevalent consensus among 
academics concerning the relationship of modern standing doctrine to early federal judicial 
practice: 
In separate, major, and compelling efforts, Louis Jaffe in 1965, Raoul Berger in 1969, 
and Steven Winter in 1988 have demonstrated that injury was not a requisite for 
judicial authority in either the colonial, framing, or early constitutional periods. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789, like several contemporaneous state statutes, allowed “informer” 
actions. English practice included prerogative writs, mandamus, certiorari, and 
prohibitions, all designed to “restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or 
public agencies,” and requiring only “neglect of justice,” not individual injury. 
Stranger suits and relator practice countenanced the assertion of judicial power 
without the existence of personal stakes in the controversy. 
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 
1151–52 (1993) (citations omitted); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: 
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 366–67 and cites therein; Cass R. Sunstein, What’s 
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
More recently, the following article has contested some of these broad claims, see Caleb Nelson & 
Ann Woolhandler, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004).  
 Although the historical record concerning statutory standing contains some unambiguity, the 
dispute concerning the antecedents to modern standing doctrine is most acute in the context of 
legal claims arising directly from Constitution. This Essay’s thesis does not turn on resolving 
these interesting historical debates, whether founded on contemporaneous English practice, 
practices during the founding period, or practices shortly after the Constitution was ratified. 
Because the thesis advanced here and in my earlier work, see supra note 32, and cites therein, 
emphasizes the important functions that the modern standing doctrine serves, it is not in tension 
with claims that the doctrine has earlier historical antecedents than some constitutional 
historians have previously recognized. The goal of this Essay is instead to situate statutory 
standing within a broader theoretical and doctrinal framework. That includes identifying the 
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Of course the development of professional bureaucracies, 
including criminal prosecutors’ offices, significantly curtailed reliance 
on private enforcement for many rights so enforced in the framing 
period,62 but that history does not undermine the central argument 
here: We have two competing models of separation of powers that 
create a tension in the context of congressional standing conferrals. 
There are times when it is possible to find a middle ground between 
two opposing theories. Reliance on balancing tests in certain criminal 
procedure cases was often the product of such efforts,63 as was Justice 
Powell’s attempt, and then Justice O’Connor’s, to find a middle 
position between the opposing extremes on race-based affirmative 
action.64 In the context of statutory standing, Justice Kennedy has 
also sought a middle ground. Justice Kennedy concedes that Congress 
may broaden the scope of injury, but he contends that in doing so, it 
must tie its conferral to a specific class of individuals, presumably a 
class that is narrower in scope than one susceptible to diffuse harm 
status were they to rely on the Constitution alone as the basis for 
standing to sue. Consider Kennedy’s famous passage from his Lujan 
partial concurrence and partial concurrence in the judgment: 
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation 
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read 
the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, however, 
Congress must, at the very least, identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the 
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.65 
Notably, Justice Kennedy did not concur in the judgment on 
this very point; rather he chose to recast the majority opinion, which 
he joined, rendering ironic his assertion about not reading the 
majority opinion “to suggest a contrary view.”66 As Kennedy has 
 
separation of powers underpinnings of the modern standing doctrine as it has been applied and 
understood since the Progressive Era.  
 62.  Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1414 (1988). 
 63.  Michael R. Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, and the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. 
REV. CRIM. PROC. iii  (2005); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175 (1989) (decrying the use of balancing tests). 
 64.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting 
reliance on race in medical school admissions provided it is not used as a quota, that it is a plus 
factor in a holistic review of combined files); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking 
algorithmic use of race in race-based affirmative action program at undergraduate level); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 206 (2003) (allowing reliance on race as part of holistic process despite 
effectively replicating algorithmic function with careful daily review of law school admissions 
reports). 
 65.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
 66.  Id.  
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shown, as a possible middle ground one can posit that Congress has 
the power to broaden standing by statute, just not too much. 
IV. SPOKEO AND THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY STANDING REVISITED 
One could similarly devise various middle ground opinions in 
Spokeo. For example, the Court could rule for Robins by claiming that 
in combination, Lujan and Laidlaw impose less stringent 
standing requirements when the litigation is between private parties, 
as opposed to when a private party sues a government official. There 
is no foundation for this distinction within standing doctrine, which 
likely explains why it did not form the basis for the doctrinal debate 
between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia in Laidlaw. This 
distinction is also not persuasive as a matter of policy. As previously 
shown, the decision to allow enforcement of congressional policy with 
purely private litigation, public litigation, or various regimes in 
between, represent points along a broader congressional policy 
enforcement spectrum.67 The constitutional standing rules do not 
change based upon where along that spectrum Congress chooses to 
locate its enforcement scheme.68 
Alternatively, the Court could rule for Robins on the ground 
that whereas Lujan failed to link the injury in any specific way to the 
individual claimants, it was Robins’s personal data that was 
erroneously (if benignly) disclosed. Whereas the immediately 
preceding account offers an unsatisfying distinction between Laidlaw 
and Lujan, this theory fails altogether to account for Laidlaw, which 
presented similarly attenuated claims to injury. It also creates a 
further doctrinal tension with such cases as Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,69 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood,70 and Havens Realty v. Coleman.71 In each of these cases, 
the Supreme Court granted standing based upon a federal statute that 
expanded the scope of justiciable injury. In addition to allowing 
 
 67.  See supra note 56–58, and cites therein. 
 68.  Alternatively, one might analogize this distinction to the discredited non-delegation 
doctrine. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). To the extent 
that the doctrine remains relevant, however, it would seem to cut the other way, imposing more, 
rather than less, restrictive limits on purely private actions. 
 69.  409 U.S. 205, 208–12 (1972) (construing Fair Housing Act to confer standing on testers 
seeking to document standing even though they were not personally victims). 
 70.  441 U.S. 91, 111–15 (1979) (extending Trafficante to permit whites to raise challenge to 
racial steering practices on ground that they were denied opportunity to reside within an 
integrated community). 
 71.  455 U.S. 363, 382 (1982) (conferring standing on housing tester, under Fair Housing 
Act, who was not in the market for rental property). 
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standing to challenge a technical permit violation that produced no 
harm, the Court has afforded standing to persons who were not 
themselves victims of housing discrimination to challenge racial 
steering practices in a variety of ways.72 This includes allowing testers 
standing even though they themselves are not in the market for 
housing, and expanding the scope of “injury” to include the loss of an 
opportunity to reside in an integrated community even though the 
claimants, once more, were not victims of the discriminatory practices 
and appeared to be raising the claims of others who were. 
These cases further support the Allen intuition that standing 
doctrine affords Congress broad latitude in deciding who is permitted 
to bring suit. Or, as stated in Linda RS v. Richard D.,73 “[t]he . . . 
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes 
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”74 
Resolving Spokeo by narrowly distinguishing the Lujan facts 
ultimately postpones an important question for another day, and it 
does so at the expense of lower federal courts who must decide these 
cases and of persons who rely on federal statues as the basis for their 
legal claims and for standing to raise those claims. 
This Essay has shown that the difficulty, and uncertainty, 
arises as an inevitable feature of two competing premises concerning 
the purpose of standing doctrine. This conflict ultimately involves the 
nature of our representative democracy and its implications for the 
scope of congressional power to choose preferred policy, including how 
to have that policy enforced. Either Congress has the power to define 
the scope of standing as a means of supplementing, or even 
supplanting, executive enforcement for regulatory policy or it does not. 
Failing to clarify this important constitutional inquiry leaves 
Congress, the executive branch, and those who engage in statutory 
enforcement in a state of ongoing uncertainty. For many observers, 
the resulting unpredictability creates the not altogether unjustified 
supposition that when standing restrictions are imposed, the unstated 
motivation is dislike for the particular legislative policy. This occurred 
in Lujan itself. Justice Blackmun accused Justice Scalia of having 
undertaken “a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of 
environmental standing,”75 and added that he had “difficulty 
imagining this Court applying its rigid principles of geographic 
formalism anywhere outside the context of environmental claims. As I 
 
 72.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208–12. 
 73.  410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
 74.  Id. at 617 n.3.  
 75.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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understand it, environmental plaintiffs are under no special 
constitutional standing disabilities.”76 
At its Progressive-era inception, or reinvigoration,77 modern 
standing doctrine served a set of liberal/Progressive causes. In more 
recent decades in the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods, it served 
as the basis for retrenching a once liberal set of rights. But until 
Lujan, this was accomplished in the context of cases in which litigants 
rested on the Constitution directly for standing. The Spokeo case does 
not bring those issues before the Court. Despite these ideological 
shifts, and despite claims in the literature to the contrary, the 
composition of constitutional standing largely coheres.78 That is not to 
suggest that no anomalies remain, but rather that the anomalies do 
not challenge the foundations of standing and the underlying premises 
of our constitutional adjudicatory system. The same cannot be said of 
statutory standing, a doctrine that presently operates on two 
conflicting premises that get to the heart of separation of powers. 
Spokeo offers the Court a critical opportunity to set the record straight 
and to clarify this important doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Spokeo is not a case about an obscure doctrine, an instance of 
lawyer’s law. Rather it is a case that goes to the heart of our system of 
governance. Conservatives frequently define themselves by 
disclaiming a judicial pretense to upset legislative choice of policy, and 
with good reason. Conservatism often equates with judicial humility. 
In the context of statutory standing, humility has given way to hubris, 
the sort that claims to protect congressional choice of policy by 
preventing Congress from the very policy choices it has made. Lujan 
manifested that mistake, thereby creating a tension that was destined 
to arise, and that in fact did so in Laidlaw. 
Spokeo provides the Court with a much-needed opportunity to 
restore statutory standing to its proper constitutional foundations, 
rested on the three-legged stool. The job of the Court is to preserve 
and protect congressional primacy in lawmaking. A logical first step is 
deferring when Congress chooses who has standing to enforce its 
statutes. 
 
 
 76.  Id. at 595.  
 77.  See supra note 61, and cites therein (discussing debates over historical antecedents to 
modern standing doctrine). 
 78.  See supra note 34 (discussing reconciliation of standing case law).  
